





2. A COUNTERINTUITIVE STARTING POINT 
We start from a simple question. Imagine two hypothetical countries: 
1. Country A is characterized by the widespread presence of criminal organizations, that generate 
huge flows of capitals of illicit origins. Banks and non bank financial institutions are largely 
under the control of such organizations. Organized crime is capable of corrupting both public 
officials - including law enforcement officials - and legislators, thus being able to obtain 
virtually any regulation deemed necessary to support their criminal activities; 
2. In country B, by contrast, organized crime and corruption are completely absent. Country B is a 
solid democracy, whose legislators actively serve the interest of their constituents. 
We ask the reader to leave aside for a moment her personal knowledge of real world 
countries that offer money laundering services.  Which of these countries is more likely to supply 
money laundering services in the international market? 
Intuition would appear to point to country A. The possibility of offering money 
laundering services would imply several advantages for criminal organizations. First, they could 
diversify their criminal activities, thus generating further sources of income from the commissions 
charged to foreign criminal organizations. At the same time, by integrating vertically into the 
downstream money laundering market, criminal organizations could reduce the cost of the 
laundering of capitals they generated from other criminal activities. 
Yet, if we turn the question on its head and instead ask anyone acquainted with the 
issues related to money laundering schemes to list real world countries that supply money 
laundering services, we expect the answer to be rather different. Countries usually associated with 
the offer of financial services to criminal organizations appear to fit more easily into the “B type” 
described above. 
Take, for example, the list of “Non Cooperative Countries or Territories” published last 
June by the Financial Action Task Force on the Prevention of Money Laundering (Fatf).8  It 
includes Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. 
The vast majority of these countries looks more like the “B type” described above.9  
The reverse argument appears to hold as countries that are renowned for the presence of criminal 
organizations do not seem to play a prominent role on the supply side of the international money 
laundering market.  Our country is a good example.  Organized crime is surely present in Italy, and 
yet Italy does not appear to play a great role as a supplier of criminal financial services.  To be sure, 
capitals of illicit origin tend to return in Italy, but only after having been laundered in one of the 
many well known international washing machines. 
Going back to the list, it includes some obvious exceptions, i.e. countries that are closer 
to the “A type” described above.  However, these exceptions may be explained on different 
grounds, once we recognize the nature of the exercise conducted by the Fatf.  We take the list as the 
only, if not the most reliable, proxy of countries that are involved in the international market for 
money laundering services.  A fundamental caveat is however mandated.  We are concerned with 
off-shore countries that attract money of illicit origins.  With this respect, the list is likely to be 
over-inclusive.  The Fatf list is neither a list of countries that offer money laundering services, nor a 
list of off-shore countries.  Rather, it is a list of countries that do not cooperate in the global fight 
against money laundering.  The perspective taken by the Fatf has several implications.  The lack of 
                                                                 
8 FATF. (2000) 
9 Of course this observation leaves aside any evaluation of the different relative weight these countries have in the 
market. 
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cooperation, might depend on factors other than a precise attitude of the country towards money 
laundering.  For example, the country might lack the necessary resources in technical, financial, and 
human capital necessary to actively and effectively cooperate at the international level.  Second, and 
most importantly for our analysis, the Fatf has focused attention on all non cooperative countries.  
The list might thus include two very different types of countries:  On the one hand, countries for 
which non cooperation is part of a wider strategy aimed at attracting foreign illegal capitals; (the 
ones with which we are concerned) on the other hand, countries for which non cooperation is more 
usefully thought of as a means through which the country aims at protecting domestic illegal capital 
from investigations undertaken abroad. 
Furthermore, although we just depicted the extreme cases, there is the obvious 
possibility that non cooperation might be the result of a mixed set of factors, like inadequacies in 
the bureaucratic structure, strengthened by pressure from criminal organizations aimed at protecting 
their business.  Consider Russia.  Although we did not conduct any specific research on Russia,10 it 
appears fair to say that the lack of cooperation is not rooted into a strategic decision not to 
cooperate, but is rather the result of a situation of huge institutional problems connected with the 
transition to a market economy. Moreover, organized crime in Russia, if anything, appears to be a 
buyer rather than a supplier of money laundering services in the international market, as some well 
known scandals appear to suggest. 
3. A SUPPLY AND A DEMAND SCHEDULE FOR MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION 
As already noted, we treat regulation that can affect money laundering as a product, 
with a demand and supply schedule.  But whose demand schedule is driving the system? 
Assume that the policy maker in a given country has not yet decided the direction that it 
will impose on its financial regulation, with specific regard to money laundering.  The policy maker 
may thus decide to implement a regulation that creates serious obstacles to money laundering, or it 
can decide to make the opposite choice, devising a regulation that facilitates money laundering. 
Money laundering generates costs as well as benefits for the parties involved.  The costs 
for society, as underscored above, depend on the circumstance that more predicate offences will be 
committed if money laundering is possible and on the possible negative impact that money 
laundering will have on the financial system.  The benefits of money laundering accrue, first of all, 
to criminal organizations, that can employ the proceeds of crime avoiding the threat of being 
prosecuted for predicate offences.  On the other side of the transaction, money laundering offers to 
the launderer the possibility to earn a commission in exchange for its services.  Four different 
categories of actors potentially interested in the regulation can be identified:  a) the policy maker;  
b) criminal organizations;  c) those who bear the costs of money laundering; d) the financial 
community.  Starting with the latter, it does not appear easy to predict which side will the financial 
community take. For the sake of simplicity, we can think that the utility function of financial 
intermediaries does not appear to be affected by whether profits stem from legal or illegal financial 
activities, thus probably making them disinterested in the choice taken by the policy maker.  The 
interests of b) and c) are obviously incompatible, as the gains of the former depend on the loss of 
the latter; a) is in the middle, having to decide which demand schedule to follow. 
Note that we are not assuming that b) and c) are necessarily based outside the country 
where the policy maker we are concerned with is based.  This is not an assumption, but rather the 
consequence of our line of argument.  As with all policy issues, as long as the costs and benefits of 
a decision fall within the boundaries of the area of influence of the policy maker, we expect to have 
an efficient decision.  Policy makers in countries where crime is pervasive will tend to bear at least 
some of the costs associated with a decision to favor money laundering.   
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countries included in the list should be taken as little more than anecdotical evidence. 
